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Abstract
Arrow’s ‘impossibility’ theorem asserts that there are no satisfactory methods of aggregating
individual preferences into collective preferences in many complex situations. This result has
ramifications in economics, politics, i.e., the theory of voting, and the structure of tournaments. By
identifying the objects of choice with mathematical sets, and preferences with Hausdorff measures
of the distances between sets, it is possible to extend Arrow’s arguments from a sociological to a
mathematical setting. One consequence is that notions of reversibility can be expressed in terms
of the relative configurations of patterns of sets.
PACS numbers: 01.55,+b,01.90+g,01.70+w
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1. 1. ARROW’S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM
One of the most significant ’no-go’ results discovered in the twentieth century is Ar-
row’s theorem concerning the impossibility of devising satisfactory methods for aggregating
individual preferences into collective preferences in many complex situations [1]. Arrow’s
arguments have given rise to a voluminous literature with wide ranging applications in eco-
nomics, politics, and the organization of tournaments. The feasibility of further extending
these results to areas of mathematics and physics depends on finding appropriate counter-
parts to Arrow’s objects of choice, i.e., various social states, and reinterpreting the concept
of preference in quantitative terms. One possible approach is to identify the objects of choice
with mathematical sets, and to relate the associated preferences to Hausdorff’s asymmetric
distances between sets.
To be specific, let A,B,C, etc. denote the objects of choice, and represent the relations
of preference by means of the symbols  and ≺ : consequently a formula such as A  B
signifies that A is preferred over B, and similarly the expressions B  A and A ≺ B both
mean that B is preferred to A. Suppose now that there are three individuals labeled 1, 2, 3,
each of which can choose between the two alternatives A and B. Then, irrespective of which
combination of preferences - - - out of a total of eight possibilities - - - occurs, there is
a reasonable way of aggregating the individual preferences into a collective preference. For
instance, the pattern
1 : A  B ; 2 : A  B ; 3 : B  A (1)
indicates the overall preference for the choice of A in virtue of majority rule.
Arrow’s arguments become relevant in the slightly more complicated situation where there
are three individuals who can choose among three alternatives A, B, and C. Although in
this case there are many combinations of preferences that can be aggregated into collec-
tive preferences with the help of plausible schemes such as majority rule, there are some
recalcitrant outliers whose antecedents date back more than two centuries [2]. Suppose, for
instance that the first individual orders the objects of choice in the sequence
1 : A  B  C  A . (2)
This is an instance where the preferences of A over B and B over C do not imply that A
is preferred over C. Sequences of this kind are said to be intransitive [3]. The ambiguity is
2
heightened still further if the remaining two individuals order their preferences in a cyclic
version of Eq.(2), viz.
2 : B  C  A  B , (3)
3 : C  A  B  C , (4)
Clearly majority rule can’t achieve a consensus in this situation. Experience shows that
even more elaborate voting schemes fail to extract a fair and favored choice from such
sets of intransitive preferences. Arrow’s point is that this is not a matter of ingenuity but
rather an impossibility: in some complex situations there is simply no reasonable method
for aggregating individual preferences into a collective preference. The reasoning is based
on making precise the notions of ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’.
Arrow lists four criteria that ought to be satisfied by any acceptable voting procedure:
1. Local and global harmony. Suppose that in a bloc of voters every individual has the
same preference, say, A over B (A  B), then the collective preference of the entire
group is also A over B.
2. All choices are possible. Every individual can in principle choose among all available
alternatives and these can be ordered in every possible sequence of preferences.
3. Independence of irrelevant alternatives. The set of choices, A, B, etc., available to every
individual constitutes an environment of admissible options. All methods of aggregat-
ing individual preferences into a collective preference then must be independent of any
choice that lies outside of the environment.
4. Non-dictatorship. The collective preferences of a group of individuals are not to be
determined solely by the preferences of a single individual.
At first sight these innocuous propositions appear to be part of any reasonable voting
scheme, but more than sixty years ago Arrow discovered an astonishing twist - - - these
propositions are actually incompatible! This basic flaw is the reason that it is impossible to
devise a general method for aggregating individual preferences into a collective preference
applicable under all circumstances. The technical details of the proof are given in [1]. A
more mathematically oriented treatment is presented in [4].
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FIG. 1: Arrangement of the point sets A and B over a grid of unit squares
2. 2. THE HAUSDORFF DISTANCE BETWEEN SETS
Let S be a planar set composed of the points si, 1 ≤ i ≤ NS, and T be another set in
the same plane composed of the points tj, 1 ≤ j ≤ NT . Further, let d(si, tj) denote the
ordinary Euclidean distance between si and tj. Then the Hausdorff distance from the set S
to the set T is given by the radius of the smallest disk centered at any point of S that also
includes at least one point of T [5]. This definition corresponds to the expression
δH(S → T ) = sup
si∈S
inf
tj∈T
d(si, tj) . (5)
In a similar fashion the Hausdorff distance from the set T to the set S is given by the radius
of the smallest disk centered at any point of T that also includes at least one point of S.
This definition corresponds to a formula analogous to (5),
δH(T → S) = sup
tj∈T
inf
si∈S
d(si, tj) . (6)
In general, these distances depend both on the configurations as well as the relative positions
of the sets S and T . Consequently, the directed Hausdorff distances δH(S → T ) and δH(T →
S) may be unequal, even though the underlying Euclidian metric d(si, tj) is symmetric. This
is the essential property that furnishes a link between the concepts of choice and preference
and the mathematical notion of a distance between sets
The transition from Arrow to Hausdorff can be illustrated with the aid of several very
simple examples. Suppose that A and B are both two-point sets with the elements a1, a2 ∈
A, and b1, b2 ∈ B, arranged over a grid of unit squares as shown in Figure 1. In this case
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the basic distance definition (5) reduces to the simpler form
δH(A→ B) = max
{
min
i
d(a1, bi), min
i
d(a2, bi)
}
. (7)
The four Euclidean distances between the points in the two sets can then be displayed in
the form of a 2× 2 array

b1 b2
a1
√
5
√
10
a2 1
√
2
 (8)
Inserting these numbers into (7) one obtains
δH(A→ B) = max
{
min(
√
5,
√
10), min(1,
√
2)
}
, (9)
or
δH(A→ B) = max
{√
5, 1
}
=
√
5 . (10)
The reverse Hausdorff distance δH(B → A) can then be computed from the analog of (7),
viz.
δH(B → A) = max
{
min
i
d(b1, ai), min
i
d(b2, ai)
}
. (11)
Again, inserting the numbers, the result is
δH(B → A) = max
{
min(
√
5, 1), min(
√
10,
√
2)
}
, (12)
or
δH(B → A) = max
{
1,
√
2
}
=
√
2 . (13)
Clearly, the numerical differences between the two Hausdorff distances are due to the fact
that (10) corresponds to a ‘max - min by rows’ algorithm whereas (13) corresponds a ‘max
- min by columns’ algorithm. The two parallel interpretations of the expression A  B
are now complete: in Arrow’s language this means that the social state A is preferred over
the social state B; in Hausdorff’s terminology A and B are sets whose configurations and
relative positions imply that the Hausdorff distance from A to B is greater than the distance
from B to A.
The next increment of complexity is the Condorcet triplet Eq.(2). This intransitive
sequence of preferences can also be associated with a pattern of sets. Figure 2 shows one
possible arrangement of three seta A, B, C whose relative Hausdorff distances mirror the
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preference rankings in Eq.(2). It is easy to confirm this numerically since the A and B sets
are exactly the same as in Figure 1; and it merely remains to evaluate the new Hausdorff
distances δH(B → C) and δH(C → A). Following the steps of the prior calculations in
Eqs.(7)-(8), we first list the Euclidian distances between the points B and C in an array

c1 c2
b1 1
√
2
b2 2
√
5
 (14)
The corresponding Hausdorff distance is then
δH(B → C) = max
{
min(1,
√
2), min(2,
√
5)
}
, (15)
or
δH(B → C) = max
{
1, 2
}
= 2 . (16)
The reverse Hausdorff distance is given by
δH(C → B) = max
{
min(1, 2), min(
√
2,
√
5)
}
, (17)
or
δH(C → B) = max
{
1,
√
2
}
=
√
2 . (18)
Similarly the distance between C and A can be inferred from the array

c1 c2
a1
√
2
√
5
a2
√
2
√
5
 (19)
Specifically,
δH(A→ C) = max
{
min(
√
2,
√
5), min(
√
2,
√
5)
}
, (20)
or
δH(A→ C) = max
{√
2,
√
2
}
=
√
2 . (21)
The last distance is given by
δH(C → A) = max
{
min(
√
2,
√
2), min(
√
5,
√
5)
}
, (22)
or
δH(C → A) = max
{√
2,
√
5
}
=
√
5 . (23)
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The equivalences between the preference rankings in Eq.(2) and the distance inequalities
implicit in Figure 2 can now be listed in a unified form:
A  B ⇔ δH(A→ B) =
√
5 >
√
2 = δH(B → A)
B  C ⇔ δH(B → C) = 2 >
√
2 = δH(C → B) (24)
C  A ⇔ δH(C → A) =
√
5 >
√
2 = δH(A→ C)
FIG. 2: Arrangement of three point sets A, B, C whose mutual Hausdorff distances satisfy the
inequalities in Eq.(24).
3. 3. REVERSIONS
In ordinary particle dynamics a reversal of motion is usually effected by a reversal of
all velocity components. This typographical device is adequate for systems governed by
differential equations, but in more general situations where the dynamical evolution is de-
scribed by mathematical flows the replacement of t by −t does not necessarily correspond
to a physical time reversal [6]. The disconnect between reversions and sign changes is even
more drastic in Arrow’s scheme of preference rankings. In this situation it seems reasonable
to associate reversions with an interchange of preferences: instead of A  B we presume
B  A. In this sense, the reverse of the Condorcet triplet Eq.(2) is
A  C  B  A (25)
Switching preferences also implies a reversal of the inequalities in the corresponding Haus-
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FIG. 3: Arrangement of three point sets A, B, C, corresponding to the Hausdorff inequalties in
Eq.(26).
dorff distances : and this, in turn, requires that the pattern of sets in Figure 2 has to be
shifted. A minimal rearrangement consistent with the sequence of preferences in Eq.(25) is
shown in Figure 3. Comparing with Figure 2, it is clear that all of the individual points
retain their positions, just the labeling of the sets has changed. The resulting collection of
preferences and Hausdorff distances can then be summarized in a form similar to Eq.(24):
A  C ⇔ δH(A→ C) =
√
5 >
√
2 = δH(C → A)
C  B ⇔ δH(C → B) = 2 >
√
2 = δH(B → C) (26)
B  A ⇔ δH(B → A) =
√
5 >
√
2 = δH(A→ B)
Evidently, this perspective on reversions has no relation to the introduction of minus signs.
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